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Abstract
Gateways implementing IPSec protocol suite are used to provide secure communication between different client machines over
public infrastructure. However the exploitation of covert storage channel in the IPSec protocol may defeat the very purpose of
protecting leakage of information from the client machine. This threat gets more aggravated as some of the channels might be
exploited from the client machine even without compromising the security of the IPSec gateways. The possibility of information
leakage by compromising only the client machine, either in form of a colluding insider or due to the presence of some malware
at the client machine, poses a serious threat to any organization dealing with sensitive information and a resourceful adversary.
The existing approaches to mitigate the threats against storage covert channels severely restrict the usability of many QoS aware
applications by reducing the allowance of relevant header ﬁelds to minimum. This work overcomes the same by creating separate
partitions based on application speciﬁc QoS requirements. Subsequent IPSec processing involves extension of the scope of security
services as per the predeﬁned QoS requirements. This is achieved by appropriate allowance of QoS related header ﬁelds using
a comprehensive treatment of the storage and timing covert channels. When compared with existing approaches, the proposed
approach provides better usability in QoS demanding contexts while maintaining equivalent strength of protection against storage
covert channels and providing equivalent performance. The paper also outlines an implementation strategy of the same on Linux
kernel IPSec stack.
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1. Introduction
Today several organizations securely exchange a great deal of conﬁdential information over the Internet and
Intranets using IPSec1–3 based Virtual Private Networks (VPN). However, the long known problem of covert channels
is often not considered in such scenarios. Lampson4 introduced covert channels in the context of monolithic systems
as a mechanism by which a process at a high security level leaks information to a process at lower security level;
violating the mandatory access control policy of the system. Traditionally covert channels were classiﬁed into two
types: storage and timing channels, even though there is no fundamental distinction between them5. Storage Covert
Channel involves direct or indirect writing of a storage location by one process and the direct or indirect reading of
the storage location by another process (Ex. Use of IP header ﬁelds to signal information). A potential covert channel
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is a Timing Channel if its scenario of use involves a process that signals information to another by modulating its own
use of system resources (e.g., CPU time) in such a way that this manipulation affects the real response time observed
by the second process (Ex. Sender varies the nonzero CPU time, which it uses during each quantum allocated to it,
to send different symbols). Though originally introduced in the context of monolithic systems, the potential damage
due to covert channels in the distributive environment6,7 increases manifold as critical secrets like cryptographic keys,
plain text data, and authentication passwords can often be leaked over very low bandwidth channels. The capacity of
such covert channels over network has also greatly increased because of new high-speed technologies, and this trend
is likely to continue.
It is important to note that for supporting generic applications and network infrastructure, most of the protocols
provide a large allowance for its header ﬁelds which in turn been exploited as a storage covert channel. IP header’s Type
of Service (TOS), Don’t Fragment (DF)8, the TCP header’s Flags ﬁeld9 are some examples of covert storage channels.
The storage covert channel gets magniﬁed in scenarios with variable length header ﬁelds and padding ﬁelds10. In the
context of timing covert channels, information can be encoded by varying packet rates, transmission time etc11,12.
The covert sender may vary its packet transmission between multiple packet rates each time interval and subsequently
the receiver measures the rate in each time interval and decodes the covert information. Other class of timing channels
are on/off timing channel11 and covert channels by modulating the use of protocol operations, channel erasures, Packet
sorting13 etc.
In order to provide required security services, a number of cryptographic protocols have been proposed at different
layers of TCP/IP stack. Application layer encryption, viz., PGP14 for secure mail transfer, TLS15 based secure TCP
communication, IPSec for providing IP layer security1–3, MPLS based security16 at data link layer are the prominent
ones. Due to scalability and wide acceptance of the IP protocol and its application independent character, the IPSec
protocol has become a standard for providing Internet security at gateway level. IPSec protocol ESP in tunnel mode
of operation provides security to entire IP header and payload1–3 and can provide protection to most of the storage
covert channel attacks mentioned in the previous section. However, in spite of that, the tunnel mode of ESP is not
free of storage channel due to its typical processing of some of the IP header ﬁelds related to QoS and DF bits which
is elaborated in the subsequent sections.
Section 2 discusses the problem of covert channel of IPSec with a clear deﬁnition of the threat and adversary
scenario. Section 3 discusses the existing solutions and brings out the shortcomings of such solutions from the usability
aspects. The proposed solution to mitigate the threat without sacriﬁcing the usability aspects is detailed in section 4.
Section 5 outlines the implementation overview of the proposed solution on IPSec stack of Linux. A comparative
analysis of the proposed solution with the existing strategies for mitigation of storage covert channel is presented at
section 6. Finally the paper concludes with a discussion about the approach at section 7.
2. Covert Channels in IPSec Protocol
This section discuss about the covert channels in the IPSec protocol with respect to a typical deployment scenario.
It elaborates the problem of storage covert channel with a greater depth, as that is the focus of this paper.
2.1 Deployment scenario and TCB deﬁnition
As illustrated in the Fig. 1, the work considers a deployment scenario of IPSec VPN comprised of two or more
Local Area Networks (LANs) interconnected over an insecure Wide Area Network (WAN). In this scenario, the IPSec
VPNs not only provide secure communication between several LANs but also conﬁnes communication of LAN hosts
to the VPN by using cryptographic partitioning. In this deployment scenario, the IPSec gateways are conﬁgured with
authenticated encryption using Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) protocol in the tunnel mode. It considers the
entire IPSec gateways to be part of the Trusted Computing Base (TCB)17 and, therefore, not assumes any adversarial
action at the IPSec gateways.
2.2 Adversary model
The adversary is assumed to be present in one or more client machines of the LAN and as an active adversary in the
WAN. In this context, the adversary controls one or more compromised hosts in the LAN (as shown in the Client 11
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Fig. 1. Deployment scenario.
in Fig. 1) as well as an active Man-In-the-Middle (MIM) site in the WAN (as shown in the Eavesdropper in Fig. 1)
and exploits the covert channel to leak information from the LAN component to the WAN component breaching the
overall security policy enforced at the IPSec gateways.
2.3 Threat model
In this context, the channels accessible either implicitly or explicitly to the client machines constitute the possible
storage or timing covert channels. We have revisited the latest RFC’s of the IPSec protocol suite and the Linux Kernel
implementation and agree to the enumeration of the covert channels in IPSec found in previous work by researchers18.
The covert timing channels are constituted using one or combination of the following: Packet Size, Inter Packet Delay,
Packet Ordering, Packet Drop and Path MTU discovery. The storage channel is constituted by the DSCP, ECN and
Flags bit of IP header.
3. Existing Solution Against Covert Channels of IPSec and its Effects
This section summarizes the ﬁndings from the literature survey on the existing approach on the topic of mitigation
of storage covert channel in IPSec and also its impact on usability and performance.
3.1 Existing solutions against covert channels of IPSec
The mitigation strategy against any covert channel has to deal with either elimination or capacity reduction of such
channels5. The mitigation of the above mentioned storage channels are eliminated mostly by resetting the values at
the IPSec gateway to a single default value. The capacity reduction of timing channel, on the other hand, relied on
different randomization techniques for reduction of the channel capacity to an acceptable limit using randomization
of packet size, inter-packet delay, re-ordering of packets etc. However, it is realized that the complete elimination of
timing channels, in contrast to that of storage channels, is not feasible even in private dedicated network due to the
very requirement of sharing some common resources over network.
3.2 Usability impact of the existing solutions against covert channels in IPSec
Though elimination of storage channels by resetting header ﬁelds provides a strong protection, it denies some
possible features to user applications and also compromises any possibility of trafﬁc shaping at the WAN segment. The
denial of the usage of DSCP and ECN bits could have impact on the usability, especially, as the functioning of Internet
is becoming dependent on various classes of trafﬁc with different service requirements. The advent of Differentiated
Services20 makes this requirement particularly acute. Thus, packets may be grouped into behaviour aggregates such
that each behaviour aggregate may have a common set of behavioural characteristics or a common set of delivery
requirements. As an example, emerging applications using VoIP and video streaming could be cited. These services
demand availability of higher bandwidth for their operation and perform best in the presence of suitable Quality of
Service architectures, viz, IntServ, DiffServ, etc.19, 20 In the context of increasing usage of VPN technologies for
providing secure and overlay networks, one has to recognize the requirements of QoS aware applications. However,
compromise of DS and CN ﬁelds restricts the usability of such QoS aware applications and architectures.
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4. Mitigation of Storage Covert Channels
This section provides the details about the proposed protocol extension to IPSec to mitigate the threats elaborated in
the previous sections. The proposed solution modiﬁes the IPSec policy deﬁnition by making it aware of storage covert
channel ﬁelds contrary to the default resetting of the ﬁeld. This will enable the security administrator of IPSec gateway
to selectively assign DS, ECN values depending on the source, destination IP address and upper layer protocol ﬁelds.
In a typical processing of tunnel mode ESP protocol, the security policy at the IPSec gateway determines whether
IPSec services will be applied on an outgoing IP datagram using selector ﬁelds like IP source and destination addresses,
protocol, port etc. In case of afﬁrmative decision, relevant security services are fetched using security association entry.
For incoming IPSec packets, relevant header ﬁelds (SPI, IP addresses) of the IP packet determines the security service
attributes for decryption of the IPSec packet, which is followed by a policy validation of the decrypted packet using
the policy database.
In this proposed approach, protection against the storage covert channel has been included as an additional security
service along with the existing cryptographic protection of IPSec protocol. This approach of selectively applying
storage covert channel protections by extending the scope of security services not only have the beneﬁts of minimal
modiﬁcation to the IPSec stack and complete backward compatibility but also have less performance overhead, as
elaborated in the subsequent sections. The working of the modiﬁed IPSec processing is described next.
The approach presented in this paper requires modiﬁcations both at the level of IPSec policy deﬁnition and also
at the level of enforcement of the policy. At the policy deﬁnition level, it is observed that standard IPSec policy
deﬁnition partitions the client networks according to the cryptographic service requirements. The policy deﬁnition
also speciﬁes the cryptographic services of each of these partitions requiring varying security services. In the proposed
approach, the policy deﬁnition demands further partitioning of the client machines depending on their treatment to
the storage channel according to the QoS requirements, referred as QoS requirement subsequently. Further, exact QoS
values for each of the partitions based on QoS based partitioning would be mentioned in the policy deﬁnition similar
to the speciﬁcation of the cryptographic services and parameters. The techniques used for the partitioning based on
cryptographic services, viz, sub-netting, IP address class based segregation could be used for the second level of
partitioning based on QoS requirement.
At the policy enforcement level, in a similar manner to the cryptographic services, restriction on the QoS related IP
header ﬁelds will be enforced by the IPSec module. Collating the above mentioned discussions, it can be observed that
for outgoing packets the entire IPSec processing is similar to the standard IPSec processing with only an additional
processing of copying the QoS value from the security association ﬁeld to the IP header, negating the possible storage
covert channel from client to the MiTM eavesdropper. In a similar line, the incoming IPSec processing resembles with
default IPSec processing with one additional policy checking of incoming QoS ﬁeld, negating the possible storage
covert channel from the MiTM eavesdropper to client.
5. Implementation of the IPSec Extension in Linux Kernel
This section provides an implementation strategy of the proposed IPSec ESP protocol extension in Linux kernel
(Ver 3.14.4). As mentioned in the previous section, the approach requires implementation both at the policy deﬁnition
level and at the policy enforcement level.
The policy deﬁnition level implementation can further be divided into policy deﬁnition and service deﬁnition
respectively. The policy deﬁnition on the basis of QoS treatment uses the same technique of security policy deﬁnition
by further partitioning a set of clients requiring identical cryptographic services into multiple subclasses where each
subclass requires separate QoS treatment. The second part of the policy deﬁnition has to deal with deﬁning and
updating kernel data structureswith the exact QoS values. Currently this is achieved as a separate user space application
where a pseudo character device driver at the kernel implements the interface between the kernel space security
databases and the user space application. The updation of standard user space utility of IPSec, setkey, can be achieved
with some effort of modiﬁcation of the parsing engine and left as a future improvement of the current work.
The policy enforcement module required the modiﬁcation of the security association related data structure, struct
xfrm−state with an additional ﬁeld, deﬁned as u8 covert−qos, and is updated by the user space application through the
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pseudo character device driver. At the packet processing module this ﬁeld is concerned for the enforcement of the IP
header ﬁeld values. In particular, this value is copied at each outgoing packet and veriﬁed for every incoming packet.
This implementation approach has very limited requirement for the modiﬁcation at the kernel space.
6. Comparisons with Existing Solutions
This section provides a comparative analysis amongst the existing approaches to mitigate the threat of storage
covert channel with the approach discussed in this paper from three different perspectives, viz., usability beneﬁt of
the current approach for the applications at the end systems, security impact of the current approach, and performance
impact due to the extra processing introduced by the proposed approach.
6.1 Usability beneﬁt of current approach
The proposed approach has the potential of allowing multiple QoS values to different end machines and it
even allows different QoS treatment to different applications of same end system. This will allow the intermediate
routers to provide desired QoS treatments to packets generated from few speciﬁc end systems dealing with stringent
QoS requirements, like VoIP phones. However, the only restriction the proposed approach poses is in the form of
requirement of extra partitioning of the client side network depending on the QoS requirement. The effect of this
will vary depending on the speciﬁc deployment scenarios, for example, cases where majority of client machines and
application require varying QoS treatment, the requirement of further partitioning the end systems based on QoS
requirement may cause some issue due to the inherent requirement of contiguous allocation of IP addresses. However,
cases where the requirement of explicit QoS treatment to end machines is similar to cryptographic partitioning, the
proposed approach will not introduce such issues.
6.2 Security impact of current approach
To understand the security impact of the proposed approach, it is important to have a comprehensive analysis
of the overall covert channels of the deployment scenario. One can represent the covert channel, indicated in the
deployment scenario, as a combination of storage channel, BS , and timing channel, BT . The existing mitigation
strategy of complete elimination of storage channel reduces the BS to zero with some residual timing channel BT ’
depending on the mitigation strategy of the timing channel. The proposed approach has the potential of restricting
the storage channel, BS , to zero. The proposed approach, in its best possible conﬁguration wherein the QoS treatment
requirement of the clients matches with that of cryptographic partitioning, has the potential of providing equivalent
protection against the timing channel. However, in the worst case, where the malicious client is a member of all the
QoS partitions due to different applications requirement, the proposed approach may introduce another extra timing
channel, say BCT , with a maximum capacity of log2 (Number of maximum QoS Partitions). It is important to notice
that this kind of conﬁguration is rare and can be avoided using proper conﬁguration. The inverse relationship between
the residual channel capacity and the QoS partitioning is consistent with the usability analysis.
6.3 Performance impact of current approach
The performance impact of the proposed approach can be best analysed by recognizing the difference between
the proposed approach and the existing standard both in protocol headers and in packet processing. To ﬁrst analyze
the impact on the performance parameters like bandwidth, it can be observed that the current extension does neither
introduce any new headers nor adds any new ﬁelds to the existing protocol headers and thus does not adversely impact
performance parameters like bandwidth consumption. To analyze the impact on the performance impacts due to extra
processing of the current approach, policy deﬁnition and policy enforcement mechanisms are analysed separately.
The policy deﬁnition requires parsing of the user domain policy deﬁnition and updation of the kernel level data
structures for policy and security association database. In this case, due to the extra partitioning requirement of QoS
protection, the proposed approach would impact the required time taken for the policy deﬁnition phase. Moreover,
the extra parameter entry at the security database for the QoS treatment for every partition would require some extra
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memory space. However, the policy deﬁnition does not have any impact on inline packet processing. The policy
enforcement mechanism of the proposed approach, in contrast to policy deﬁnition, does not introduce any extra
processing compared to the current approaches. However, in case of large QoS variation, the overall performance
would be impacted due to higher number of security policy and security association rules. However it would have
very less impact with the targeted deployment scenario with limited variance of QoS treatment. Moreover, it is also
important to observe that in the best case, where the cryptographic partitioning resembles with the QoS related
requirement, the current approach will have no additional performance impact similar to the case of security impact of
timing covert channel.
7. Conclusions
The paper presents an approach to mitigate the threat of storage covert channels without compromising the
usability of IP header by leveraging the existing partitioning mechanisms of IPSec with minimum changes to IPSec
stack. The paper also presents a detailed analysis of the usability and security impact of the proposed approach in
different deployment scenarios. It is observed that the proposed approach suits best both from usability and security
considerations for the scenarios in which the variation in the QoS requirement are similar to that of cryptographic
protection. The analysis also shows that the proposed approach does not introduce any performance penalty for
the targeted scenario and it is consistent with the security and performance impact. The paper also presents an
implementation strategy for the approach in the IPSec stack of the Linux kernel with minimal changes. The current
extension to the IPSec protocol also supports backward compatibility with existing IPSec compliant gateways.
To understand the effect of TCB on mitigation of covert channels, it is important to note that by relaxing the
TCB deﬁnition by not including the VPN gateways in TCB, the scope of the covert channel will increase drastically;
whereas by incorporating suitable security mechanisms at the client machine the covert channel can be eliminated
completely. However, in our judgment, the deployment scenario and the TCB deﬁnition is realistic as enforcement of
strict protection at the gateways is more tractable than extending the protection boundary to the end machines.
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